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What does Newcomb’s Paradox Teach us?
Abstract. In Newcomb’s paradox you choose to receive either the contents of a particular
closed box, or the contents of both that closed box and another one. Before you choose though,
an antagonist uses a prediction algorithm to deduce your choice, and fills the two boxes based
on that deduction. Newcomb’s paradox is that game theory’s expected utility and dominance
principles appear to provide conflicting recommendations for what you should choose. A
recent extension of game theory provides a powerful tool for resolving paradoxes concerning
human choice, which formulates such paradoxes in terms of Bayes nets. Here we apply this
tool to Newcomb’s scenario. We show that the conflicting recommendations in Newcomb’s
scenario use different Bayes nets to relate your choice and the algorithm’s prediction. These
two Bayes nets are incompatible. This resolves the paradox: the reason there appears to be two
conflicting recommendations is that the specification of the underlying Bayes net is open to
two, conflicting interpretations. We then show that the accuracy of the prediction algorithm in
Newcomb’s paradox, the focus of much previous work, is irrelevant. We similarly show that
the utility functions of you and the antagonist are irrelevant. We end by showing that New-
comb’s paradox is time-reversal invariant; both the paradox and its resolution are unchanged
if the algorithm makes its ‘prediction’ after you make your choice rather than before.
Keywords: Newcomb’s paradox, game theory, Bayes net, causality, determinism
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newcomb.arxiv.for.synthese.tex; 30/10/2018; 18:04; p.1
21. Introduction
1.1. Background
Suppose you meet a Wise being (W) who tells you it has put $1,000 in box
A, and either $1 million or nothing in box B. This being tells you to either
take the contents of box B only, or to take the contents of both A and B.
Suppose further that the being had put the $1 million in box B if a prediction
algorithm used by the being had said that you would take only B. If instead
the algorithm had predicted you would take both boxes, then W put nothing
in box B.
Presume that due to determinism, there exists a perfectly accurate predic-
tion algorithm, and assume that it is this perfect prediction algorithm that W
uses. Suppose further that when you choose which boxes to take, you don’t
know the prediction of that algorithm. What should your choice be?
In Table 1 we present this question as a game theory matrix involving W’s
prediction and your choice. Two seemingly logical answers to your question
contradict each other. The Realist answer is that you should take both boxes,
because your choice occurs after W has already made its prediction, and since
you have free will, you’re free to make whatever choice you want, indepen-
dent of that prediction that W made. More precisely, if W predicted you would
take A along with B, then taking both gives you $1,000 rather than nothing.
If instead W predicted you would take only B, then taking both boxes yields
$1,001,000, which again is $1000 better than taking only B.
In contrast, the Fearful answer is that W designed a prediction algorithm
whose answer will match what you do. So you can get $1,000 by taking both
boxes or get $1 million by taking only box B. Therefore you should take only
B.
This is the conventional formulation of Newcomb’s Paradox, a famous
logical riddle stated by William Newcomb in 1960 (Nozick, 1969; Gard-
ner, 1974; Bar-Hillel and Margalit, 1972; Jacobi, 1993; Hunter and Richter,
1978; Campbell and Lanning, 1985; Levi, 1982; Geanakoplos, 1997; Collins,
2001; Piotrowski and Sladkowski, 2002; Burgess, 2004). Newcomb never
published the paradox, but had long conversations about it with with philoso-
phers and physicists such as Robert Nozick and Martin Kruskal, along with
Scientific American’s Martin Gardner. Gardner said after his second Scien-
tific American column on Newcomb’s paradox appeared that it generated
more mail than any other column.
One of us (Benford) worked with Newcomb, publishing several papers
together. We often discussed the paradox, which Newcomb invented to test
his own ideas. Newcomb said that he would just take B; why fight a God-
like being? However Nozick said, “To almost everyone, it is perfectly clear
and obvious what should be done. The difficulty is that these people seem to
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divide almost evenly on the problem, with large numbers thinking that the
opposing half is just being silly” (Nozick, 1969).
It was Nozick who pointed out that two accepted principles of game the-
ory appear to conflict in Newcomb’s problem. The expected-utility principle,
considering the probability of each outcome, says you should take box B
only. But the dominance principle argues that if one strategy is always better
than the other strategies no matter what other players do, then you should
pick that strategy (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Myerson, 1991; Osborne and
Rubenstein, 1994).) No matter what box B contains, you are $1000 richer if
you take both boxes than if you take B only. So the dominance principle says
you should take both boxes.
Is there really a contradiction? Some philosophers argue that a perfect
predictor implies a time machine, since with such a machine causality is
reversed, i.e., for predictions made in the present to be perfectly determined
by events in the future means that the future causes past events.1
But Nozick stated the problem specifically to exclude backward causation
(and so time travel), because his formulation demands only that the predic-
tions be of high accuracy, not perfect. So arguments about time travel cannot
resolve the issue.
Recently an extension to game theory has been introduced that provides
a powerful tool for resolving apparent logical paradoxes concerning human
choice. This tool formulates games in terms of Bayes nets. Here we illustrate
this tool by using it to resolve Newcomb’s paradox. In a nutshell, it turns out
that Newcomb’s scenario does not fully specify the Bayes net underlying the
game you and W are playing. The two “conflicting principles of game the-
ory” actually correspond to two different underlying Bayes nets. As we show,
those nets are mutually inconsistent. So there is no conflict of game theory
principles — simply imprecision in specifying the Bayes net underlying the
game you and W and playing.
The full extension of game theory is more powerful than needed to resolve
Newcomb’s paradox; a smaller extension would suffice. However using the
full extension to analyze a paradox often draws attention to aspects of the
paradox that otherwise would escape notice. That is the case here. We use the
full extension to show that the accuracy of the prediction algorithm in New-
comb’s paradox, the focus of much previous work, is irrelevant. In addition
we show that the utility functions of you and W are actually irrelevant; the
self-contradiction built in to Newcomb’s scenario has to do with imprecision
in specification of the underlying Bayes net, and is independent of the utility
functions. We also show that Newcomb’s paradox is time-reversal invariant;
1 Interestingly, near when Newcomb devised the paradox, he also coauthored a paper prov-
ing that a tachyonic time machine could not be reinterpreted in a way that precludes such
paradoxes (Benford et al., 1970). The issues of time travel and Newcomb-style paradoxes are
intertwined.
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4both the paradox and its resolution are unchanged if the algorithm makes its
‘prediction’ after you make your choice rather than before.
In the next section we present a simplified version of our full argument.
We then review the recent extension of game theory. In the following sec-
tion we use extended game theory to provide our fully detailed resolution of
Newcomb’s paradox. We end with a discussion.
2. Decompositions of the reasoning of Fearful and Realist
There are two players in Newcomb’s paradox: you, and the wise being W .
In addition, there are two game variables that are central to the paradox: W’s
prediction, g, and the choice you actually make, y. So the player strategies will
involve the joint probability distribution relating those two variables. Since
there are only two variables, there are only two ways to decompose that joint
probability distribution into a Bayes net. These two decompositions turn out
to correspond to the two recommendations for how to answer Newcomb’s
question, one matching the reasoning of Realist and one matching Fearful.
Define ab as the event that W predicts you will take both boxes, and b as
the event that W predicts you will only take box B. Similarly define AB as the
event that you actually take both boxes, and B as the event that you actually
take only box B. So P(g = ab | y = AB) = P(ab | AB) is the probability
that W predicts correctly, given that you choose AB. Similarly P(b | B) is the
probability that W predicts correctly given that you choose only B.
Decision theory says that you should choose P(y) so as maximize the
associated expected utility. To make that formal, first we express Fearful’s
reasoning as a joint probability distribution over g and y:
P(y, g) = P(g | y)P(y)
where P(g | y) is pre-fixed, by W’s prediction algorithm.
Decision theory says that for this decomposition, you should set P(AB)
(and therefore P(B) = 1 − P(AB)) so as to maximize
1000[P(ab | AB)P(AB)] + 1001000[P(b | AB)P(AB)]
+ 0[P(ab | B)P(B)] + 1000000[P(b | B)P(B)].
Provided that the associated distributions P(ab | AB) and P(b | B) are large
enough — provided W’s prediction algorithm is accurate enough — to achieve
this maximization you should set P(B) = 1. In other words, you should
choose to take only B. This expresses Fearful’s “expected utility” reasoning.
On the other hand, under Realist’s reasoning, you can make your decision
entirely independently of W’s prediction. This amounts to the assumption that
P(y, g) = P(y | g)P(g)
= P(y)P(g)
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where you set P(y) and W sets P(g). For this decomposition, decision theory
says that you should choose P(AB) to maximize
1000[P(ab)P(AB)] + 1001000[P(b)P(AB)]
+ 0[P(ab)P(B)] + 1000000[P(b)P(B)].
which is achieved by setting P(B) = 0, no matter what P(g) is. This conclu-
sion expresses the dominance principle of game theory.
This foregoing analysis illustrates how the reasoning of Fearful and Re-
alist correspond to different decompositions of the joint probability of your
choice and W’s choice. The simple fact that those two decompositions differ
is what underlies the resolution of the paradox — you can state Newcomb’s
scenario in terms of Fearful’s reasoning, or in terms of Realist’s reasoning,
but not both.2
The foregoing analysis, while quite reasonable, does not formally estab-
lish that there is no other way to interpret Newcomb’s scenario besides the
two considered. For example, one might worry that there is a way to merge
the joint probability decompositions of Fearful and Realist, to get a hybrid
decomposition that would somehow better captures Newcomb’s scenario. In
addition, it is not clear if Newcomb’s scenario should be viewed as a decision
theory problem, in which case W’s behavior is pre-fixed (as assumed above).
Much of the literature instead casts Newcomb’s paradox as a game theory
problem, to allow W to act as an antagonist (e.g., by giving W a utility func-
tion that equals the negative of your utility function). In particular, viewing
Newcomb’s scenario as a game raises questions like how the analysis changes
if W can choose the accuracy of the prediction algorithm, rather than have it
be pre-fixed. Finally, the simplified analysis presented above does not draw
attention to subtleties of Newcomb’s scenario like its time-invariance.
To overcome these shortcomings it is necessary to use extended game
theory. That is the topic of the next two sections.
3. Extended game theory
Central to Newcomb’s scenario is a prediction process, and its (in)fallibility.
Recent work proves that any given prediction algorithm must fail on at least
one prediction task (Binder, 2008; Wolpert, 2008; Wolpert, 2010). That par-
ticular result does not resolve Newcomb’s paradox. However the proof of that
result requires an extension of conventional game theory. And as we show
below, that extension of game theory provides a way to resolve Newcomb’s
paradox.
2 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for emphasizing the underlying simplicity of
our analyzing Newcomb’s scenario by decomposing the reasoning of Fearful and Realist into
different joint probability distributions.
newcomb.arxiv.for.synthese.tex; 30/10/2018; 18:04; p.5
63.1. Extended games
To introduce extended game theory, consider a situation where there is a set of
several players, N , together with a set of game variables. A (profile) strategy
is a set of one or more joint probability distributions over the game variables.
Every player has their own set of strategies (i.e., their own set of sets of
distributions) that they can choose from. In general we indicate a member
of player i’s strategy set by S i.
If the intersection of every possible joint choice of strategies by all the
players is a single joint probability distribution, we say the game is proper.
For a proper game, it doesn’t matter what choice each of the players in N
makes; their joint choice always specifies a single joint probability distribu-
tion over the game variables. All the games considered in conventional game
theory are proper. For the rest of this subsection, we restrict attention to proper
games.
Every player in an extended game whose profile strategy set contains ex-
actly one strategy (i.e., one set of probability distributions) is called a Nature
player. Note that the strategy “chosen” by a Nature player is automatic.
Every non-Nature player i has their own utility function ui which maps any
joint value of the game variables to a real number. So given any joint choice of
strategies, in a proper game the associated (unique) joint distribution provides
the expected utility values of the non-Nature players.
To play the game, all the non-Nature players independently choose a strat-
egy (i.e., choose a set of joint distributions over the game varaibles) from their
respective strategy sets. Their doing this fixes the joint strategy, and therefore
the joint distribution over the game variables (if the game is proper), and
therefore the expected utilities of all the non-Nature players.
Game theory is the analysis of what strategies the non-Nature players
will jointly choose in this situation, under different possible choice-making
principles. One such principle is the dominance principle, mentioned above,
and another is the expected-utility principle, also mentioned above.
The following example shows how to formulate a game very popular in
conventional game theory in terms of extended game theory:
Example 1. Matching pennies.
1. In the conventional formulation of the “Matching Pennies” game, there
are two players, Row and Col, both of whom are non-Nature players.
There are also two game variables, XR and XC , with associated values
xR, xC , both of which can be either 0 or 1. To play the game player Row
chooses a probability distribution pR(xR) and player Col independently
chooses a probability distribution pC(xC). Taken together, those two dis-
tributions define the joint distribution over the game variables according
to the rule P(xR, xC) = P(xR)P(xC).
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Player Row’s utility for any joint value (xR, xC) formed by sampling P(xR, xC)
equals 1 if xR = xC , 0 otherwise. Conversely, Player Col’s utility is 0
if xR = xC , 1 otherwise. So the expected utility of player Row under
P(xR, xC) is ∑
xR,xC
pR(xR)pC(xC)δxR ,xC ,
where the Kronecker delta function δa,b equals 1 if a = b, and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, the expected utility of player Col is
∑
xR ,xC
pR(xR)pC(xC)[1 − δxR,xC ].
2. We now show how to reformulate Matching Pennies as an extended game.
Each of player Row’s strategies is specified by a single real number, pR.
The strategy S pR associated with the value pR is the set of all joint distri-
butions Pr(xR, xC) obeying Pr(xR, xC) = [pRδxR ,1 + (1 − pR)δxR ,0]Pr(xC)]
for some distribution Pr(xC). In other words, it is the set of all joint distri-
butions P(xR, xC) whose marginal P(xR) is given by pR. Similarly, each
of player Col’s strategies S pC is specified by a single real number, pC .
The strategy S pC associated with the value pC is the set of all joint distri-
butions Pr(xR, xC) such that Pr(xR, xC) = Pr(xR)[pCδxC ,1+ (1− pC)δxC ,0]
for some distribution Pr(xR).
In this extended game formulation, to play the game, each player inde-
pendently chooses a strategy. Whatever strategy S pR Player Row chooses,
and whatever strategy S pC Player Col chooses, there is a unique joint
distribution consistent with their choices,
Pr(xR, xC) = S pR ∩ S pC
= [pRδxR ,1 + (1 − pR)δxR ,0][pCδxC ,1 + (1 − pC)δxC ,0]
The expected utilities of the two players are then given by their expected
utilities under S pR ∩ S pC .
A moment’s thought shows that the extended game formulation is identical to
the original formulation in (1).
3.2. Over-played and under-played games
If a game is not proper, then there is a joint strategy, S = {S i : i ∈ N }, such
that one of two conditions holds:
1. ∩i∈N S i is empty. In this case we say the game is over-played.
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82. ∩i∈N S i contains more than one distribution over the game variables. In
this case we say the game is under-played.
Note that one way to establish that ∩i∈N S i = ∅ is to show that the sets of
conditional distributions {S i}, taken together, violate the laws of probability.
(This is how we will do it below.) In over-played games, the players are not
actually independent; there is a joint strategy choice S by the players that
is impossible, and therefore it is not the case that every player i is free to
choose the associated strategy S i without regard for the choices of the players.
Accordingly, if one specifies a game theoretic scenario where ∩i∈N S i = ∅
for some joint strategy choice S , one cannot at the same time presume that
the players are independent. If you do so, then your specification of the game
theoretic scenario contradicts itself.
Conversely, in under-played games, there is a joint strategy choice by the
players that does not uniquely determine the distribution over the game vari-
ables. Accordingly, if one specifies a game theoretic scenario where ∩i∈N S i
contains more than one element for some joint strategy choice S , then the
outcome of the game is not well-defined.
Often a “paradox” involving human choice is a game theoretic scenario
that is over-played, and therefore has a self-contradiction built into it, or
is under-played, and therefore not well-defined. To resolve either type of
paradox one simply requires that the game theoretic scenario be proper. In
particular, this is how Newcomb’s paradox is resolved.
3.3. Representing extended game theory in terms of Bayes nets
A Bayes net over a set of variables {A, B,C, . . .} is a compact, graphical rep-
resentation of a joint probability distribution over those variables (Koller and
Milch, 2003; Pearl, 2000). Often in extended game theory it is convenient to
express a player’s profile strategy set in terms of a Bayes net. In particular, ex-
pressing strategy sets this way provides a convenient way of establishing that
a game is (not) proper, and thereby analyzing apparent paradoxes involving
human choice.
Formally, any Bayes net contains three parts. The first part is a Directed
Acyclic Graph (DAG) comprising a set of vertices / nodes, V , and an associ-
ated set of directed edges, E ⊆ V × V . There are the same number of nodes
in the DAG as there are variables A, B,C, . . .. A node ν′ in the DAG such that
an edge leads directly from ν′ into a node ν is called a parent of ν. The set of
all parents of ν is written as pa(ν). Note that pa(ν) is the empty set for a root
node.
The second part of a Bayes net is a one-to-one onto function χ from the
set of nodes of the DAG to the set of variables A, B,C, . . .. So χ labels each of
the nodes of the DAG with one and only one of the variables A, B,C, . . .. The
final part of the Bayes net is a set of conditional distributions, one for each
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node ν ∈ V of the DAG. The conditional distribution at ν is a specification
of P(χ(ν) | χ[pa(ν)]), where χ[pa(ν)] is the variables associated with those
parent nodes.
It is straight-forward to see that any set of all such conditional distributions
in the Bayes net uniquely specifies a joint distribution:
P(A, B,C, . . .) =
∏
ν∈V
P(χ(ν) | χ[pa(ν)]) (1)
Conversely, any joint distribution can be expressed as a Bayes net. (Indeed, in
general any joint distribution can be expressed as more than one Bayes net.)
Many games can be very naturally defined in terms of a Bayes net. Let
(V, E) be the nodes and edges of the Bayes net. To define the game, the nodes
V are partitioned among the players. So player i is assigned some subset
Vi ⊆ V , for all i, j , i, Vi ∩ V j = ∅ and ∪iVi = V . A profile strategy of
player i is simply the specification pVi of all the conditional distributions at
the nodes in Vi. More precisely, given a pVi , the associated profile strategy
is all joint distributions represented by a Bayes net with DAG (V, E) that
have the conditional distributions pVi at the nodes in Vi, where the remaining
conditional distributions are unspecified.
We are guaranteed that any game defined in terms of a Bayes net this way
is proper. In other words, any joint profile strategy of the players corresponds
to one and only one joint distribution over the game variables. This is because
a joint strategy fixes the conditional distributions at all nodes in Vi for all i
— which means it fixes all the conditional distributions. So a joint strategy
uniquely specifies the full Bayes net. Eq. 1 then maps that Bayes net to the
(unique) joint distribution over the game variables.
Example 2. In the Matching Pennies scenario, there are two variables, xR
and xC. Therefore V consists of two nodes, νR and νC, corresponding to xR
and xC respectively. In addition, the two variables are statistically indepen-
dent, i.e., P(xR, xC) = P(xR)P(xC). Therefore in the DAG there are no edges
connecting the two nodes.
A strategy of player Row is the specification of the conditional distribution
P(χ(νR) | χ[pa(νR)]). Since νR has no parents, this is just the distribution
P(χ(νR)). Similarly, a strategy of player Col is just the distribution P(χ(νC)).
Given the DAG of the game, plugging into Eq. 1 shows that a joint distribution
is determined from a joint strategy by P(χ(νR), χ(νC)) = P(χ(νR))P(χ(νC)).
In contrast, say that Row player had moved first, and there was a noisy
sensor making an observation D of that move, and that Col chose their move
based on the value of D. Then the Bayes net would have three nodes, νR, νD
and νC , corresponding to the three variables. The node νR would have no
parents, the node νD would have (only) νR as its parent, and the node νC
would have (only) D as its parent. We can have Row and Col be non-Nature
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players, and the sensor be a Nature player. So the Row player would set
P(χ(νR) | χ[pa(νR)]) = P(χ(νR)),
by choosing a distribution from its strategy set. In addition a Nature player
would set
P(χ(νD) | χ[pa(νD)]) = P(χ(νD) | χ(νR)),
to the single strategy in its strategy set. Finally, the Col player would set
P(χ(νC) | χ[pa(νC)]) = P(χ(νC) | χ(νD)).
by choosing a distribution from its strategy set.
3.4. Conflicting DAG’s
All of the games arising in conventional game theory are formulated as a
Bayes net game involving a single underlying DAG. Accordingly, all those
games are proper.
Often in a game theory paradox it is implicitly presumed that the game is
proper, just like conventional games. In particular, it is often presumed that
the players are free to choose their strategies independently of one another.
However in contrast to the case with games in conventional game theory,
often in these paradoxes the strategy sets of the different players are defined
in terms of different Bayes net DAGs. Due to this, the presumption of player
independence might be violated. Showing that this is the case — showing
there are joint choices of conditional distributions by the players that are
not simultaneously consistent with any joint distribution — shows that the
implicit premise in the paradox that the players are independent is impos-
sible. Resolving such an apparent paradox simply means requiring that the
associated game be stated in terms of a single Bayes net DAG, so that it is
proper, and that therefore all premises actually hold.
It is exactly such reasoning that underlies the fallibility of prediction proven
in (Binder, 2008; Wolpert, 2008; Wolpert, 2010). As we show below, this
reasoning also resolves Newcomb’s paradox. Loosely speaking, Newcomb’s
scenario involves two Bayes nets, one corresponding to Realist’s reasoning,
and one corresponding to Fearful’s reasoning. One can choose one Bayes
net or the other, but to avoid inconsistency, one cannot choose both. In short,
Realist and Fearful implicitly formalize Newcomb’s scenario in different, and
incompatible ways.
In the next section, we first show how to express the reasoning of Realist
and of Fearful in terms of strategy spaces over two different Bayes net DAGs.
We then show that those two Bayes net DAGs and associated strategy spaces
cannot be combined without raising the possibility of inconsistent joint distri-
butions between the Bayes nets. This resolves Newcomb’s paradox, without
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relying on mathematizations of concepts that are vague and/or controversial
(e.g., ‘free will’, ’causality’). In addition, our resolution shows that there is
no conflict in Newcomb’s scenario between the dominance principle of game
theory and the expected utility principle. Once one takes care to specify the
underlying Bayes net game, those principles are completely consistent with
one another.
We end by discussing the implications of our analysis. In particular, our
analysis formally establishes the (un)importance of W’s predictive accuracy.
It also shows that the utility functions of you and W are irrelevant. Fur-
thermore, it provides an illustrative way to look at Newcomb’s scenario by
running that scenario backwards in time.
4. Resolving Newcomb’s paradox with extended game theory
There are two players in Newcomb’s paradox: you, and the wise being W .
In addition, there are two game variables that are central to the paradox: W’s
prediction, g, and the choice you actually make, y. So the player strategies will
involve the joint probability distribution relating those two variables. Since
there are only two variables, there are only two ways to decompose that joint
probability distribution into a Bayes net. These two decompositions turn out
to correspond to the two recommendations for how to answer Newcomb’s
question, one matching the reasoning of Realist and one matching Fearful.
4.1. The first decomposition of the joint probability
The first way to decompose the joint probability is
P(y, g) = P(g | y)P(y) (2)
(where we define the right-hand side to equal 0 for any y such that P(y) = 0).
Such a decomposition is known as a ‘Bayes net’ having two ‘nodes’ (Pearl,
2000; Koller and Milch, 2003). The variable y, and the associated uncondi-
tioned distribution, P(y), is identified with the first, ‘parent’ node. The vari-
able g, and the associated conditional distribution, P(g | y), is identified
with the second, ‘child’ node. The stochastic dependence of g on y can be
graphically illustrated by having a directed edge go from a node labeled y to
a node labeled g.
This Bayes net can be used to express Fearful’s reasoning. Fearful inter-
prets the statement that ‘W designed a perfectly accurate prediction algo-
rithm’ to imply that W has the power to set the conditional distribution in
the child node of the Bayes net, P(g | y), to anything it wants (for all y such
that P(y) , 0). More precisely, since the algorithm is ‘perfectly accurate’,
Fearful presumes that W chooses to set P(g | y) = δg,y, the Kronecker delta
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function that equals 1 if g = y, zero otherwise. So Fearful presumes that there
is nothing you can do that can affect the values of P(g | y) (for all y such that
P(y) , 0). Instead, you get to choose the unconditioned distribution in the
parent node of the Bayes net, P(y). Intuitively, this choice constitutes your
‘free will’.
Fearful’s interpretation of Newcomb’s paradox specifies what aspect of
P(y, g) you can choose, and what aspect is instead chosen by W. Those choices
— P(y) and P(g | y), respectively — are the ‘strategies’ that you and W
choose. It is important to note that these strategies by you and W do not
directly specify the two variables y and g. Rather the strategies you and W
choose specify two different distributions which, taken together, specify the
full joint distribution over y and g (Koller and Milch, 2003). This kind of
strategy contrasts with the kind considered in decision theory (Berger, 1985)
or causal nets (Pearl, 2000), where the strategies are direct specifications of
the variables (which here are g and y).
In both game theory and decision theory, by the axioms of VonNeumann
Morgenstern utility theory, your task is to choose the strategy that maximizes
your expected payoff under the associated joint distribution.3 For Fearful,
this means choosing the P(y) that maximizes your expected payoff under
the P(y, g) associated with that choice. Given Fearful’s presumption that the
Bayes net of Eq. 2 underlies the game with P(g | y) = δg,y, and that your
strategy is to set the distribution at the first node, for you to maximize ex-
pected payoff your strategy should be P(y) = δy,B. In other words, you should
choose B with probability 1. Your doing so results in the joint distribution
P(y, g) = δg,yδy,B = δg,Bδy,B, with payoff 1, 000, 000. This is the formal
justification of Fearful’s recommendation.4
Note that since this analysis treats the strategy set of W as being a single
set of joint distributions, it can be interpreted as either a decision-theoretic
scenario or a game-theoretic one, with W being a Nature player.
4.2. The second decomposition of the joint probability
The second way to decompose the joint probability is
P(y, g) = P(y | g)P(g) (3)
3 For simplicity, we make the common assumption that utility is a linear function of
payoff (Starmer, 2000). So maximizing expected utility is the same as maximizing expected
payoff.
4 In Fearful’s Bayes net, y ‘causally influences g’, to use the language of causal nets (Pearl,
2000). To cast this kind of causal relationship in terms of conventional game theory, we would
have to replace the single-stage game in Table 1 with a two-stage game in which you first set
y, and then W sets their strategy, having observed y. This two-stage game is incompatible with
Newcomb’s stipulation that W sets their strategy before you do, not after. This is one of the
reasons why it is necessary to use extended game theory rather than conventional game theory
to formalize Fearful’s reasoning.
newcomb.arxiv.for.synthese.tex; 30/10/2018; 18:04; p.12
Newcomb teaches us 13
(where we define the right-hand side to equal 0 for any g such that P(g) = 0).
In the Bayes net of Eq. 3, the unconditioned distribution identified with the
parent node is P(g), and the conditioned distribution identified with the child
node is P(y | g). This Bayes net can be used to express Realist’s reasoning.
Realist interprets the statements that ‘your choice occurs after W has already
made its prediction’ and ‘when you have to make your choice, you don’t know
what that prediction is’ to mean that you can choose any distribution h(y) and
then set P(y | g) to equal h(y) (for all g such that P(g) , 0). This is how Realist
interprets your having ‘free will’. (Note that this is a different interpretation
of ‘free will” from the one made by Fearful.) Under this interpretation, W
has no power to affect P(y | g). Rather W gets to set the parent node in the
Bayes net, P(g). For Realist, this is the distribution that you cannot affect. (In
contrast, in Fearful’s reasoning, you set a non-conditional distribution, and it
is the conditional distribution that you cannot affect.)
Realist’s interpretation of Newcomb’s paradox specifies what it is you
can set concerning P(y, g), and what is set by W . Just like under Fearful’s
reasoning, under Realist’s reasoning the ‘strategies’ you and W choose do
not directly specify the variables g and y. Rather the strategies of you and
W specify two distributions which, taken together, specify the full joint dis-
tribution. As before, your task is to choose your strategy — which now is
h(y) — to maximize your expected payoff under the associated P(y, g). Given
Realist’s presumption that the Bayes net of Eq. 3 underlies the game and
that you get to set h, you should choose h(y) = P(y | g) = δy,AB, i.e., you
should choose AB with probability 1. Doing this results in the expected payoff
1, 000 P(g = AB) + 1, 001, 000 P(g = B), which is your maximum expected
payoff no matter what the values of P(g = AB) and P(g = B) are. This is the
formal justification of Realist’s recommendation.
Note that in Fearful’s interpretation, your strategy is choosing a single real
number, while W chooses two real numbers. In contrast, in Realist’s interpre-
tation, your strategy is still to choose a single real number, but now W also
chooses only a single real number. The different interpretations correspond to
different games.5
4.3. Combining the decompositions
The original statement of Newcomb’s question is somewhat informal. As
originally stated (and commonly analyzed), Newcomb’s question does not
specify whether you are playing the game that Feaful thinks is being played,
5 In Realist’s Bayes net, given the associated restricted possible form of P(y | g), there is
no edge connecting the node for g with the node for y. In other words, P(y, g) = P(y)P(g).
This means that g and y are ‘causally independent’, to use the language of causal nets (Pearl,
2000). This causal relationship is consistent with the single-stage game in Table 1, in contrast
to the causal relationship of the game played under Fearful’s interpretation, which requires a
two-stage game.
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or the game that Realist thinks is being played. What happens if we try to
formulate Newcomb’s question more formally?
In light of extended game theory, there are three ways we could imagine
doing this. Let {S Fy } be your strategy set in the game Fearful thinks is being
played, and {S Ry } be your strategy set in the game Realist thinks is being
played. Similarly, let {S FW} be W’s strategy set in the game Fearful thinks
is being played, and {S RW} be W’s strategy set in the game Realist thinks is
being played.
1. The most natural way to accommodate the informality of Newcomb’s
question is to define an extended game where your strategy set is the
combination of what it is in Fearful’s games and in Realist’s game, i.e.,
where your strategy set is {S Fy } ∪ {S Ry }, and similarly where W’s strategy
set is {S FW} ∪ {S
R
W}.
There are two additional ways it might be possible to merge the games of
Fearful and Realist:
2. Have your strategy set be {S Fy }, while W’s strategy set is {S RW}.
3. Have your strategy set be {S Ry }, while W’s strategy set is {S FW}.
Are any of these extended games proper? If not, then the only way of
interpreting Newcomb’s scenario is as the game Fearful supposes or as the
game Realist supposes. There would be no way to combine those two games.
We start by analyzing scenario [1]. If P(g | y) is set by W to be δg,y for all y
such that P(y) , 0, as under Fearful’s presumption, then your (Realist) choice
of h affects P(g). In fact, your choice of h fully specifies P(g).6 This contra-
dicts Realist’s presumption that it is W’s strategy that sets P(g), independent
of you. So scenario [1] is impossible; it is over-played, in the terminology of
Sec. 3.2.
Now consider scenario [2]. In this scenario, any strategy S y specifies the
distribution P(y) only, with P(g | y) being arbitrary. In other words, such a
strategy consists of all joint distributions P(y, g) with the specified marginal
distribution P(y). Similarly, any strategy S W consists of all joint distributions
P(y, g) with a specified marginal P(g) and P(y, g) = h(y)P(g) for some h.
For any pair of such strategies (S y, S W ), there is a unique joint distribution
in S y ∩ S W : the product distribution P(y)P(g) where S y sets P(y) and S g sets
P(g). However this is just Realist’s extended game; it is not a new extended
game.
6 For example, make Fearful’s presumption be that P(g | y) = δg,y for all y such that
P(y) , 0. Given this, if you set h(y) = δy,AB, then P(g) = δg,AB, and if you set h(y) = δy,B, then
P(g) = δg,B.
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We end by presenting two arguments that establish the impossibility of
scenario [3]. First, we will show that if W sets P(g | y) for Fearful’s Bayes
net appropriately, then some of your strategies h(y) for Realist’s Bayes net
become impossible. In other words, for those strategy choices by W and by
you, the joint distribution over the game variables for Realists’s Bayes net
contradicts the joint distribution over the game variables for Fearful’s Bayes
net. (This is true for almost any P(g | y) that W might choose, and in particular
is true even if W does not predict perfectly.)
To begin, pick any α ∈ (1/2, 1], and presume that P(g | y) is set by W to
be αδg,y + (1 − α)(1 − δg,y) (for all y such that P(y) , 0). So for example,
under Fearful’s interpretation, where W uses a perfectly error-free prediction
algorithm, α = 1. Given this presumption, the only way that P(y | g) can
be g-independent (for all g such that P(g) , 0) is if it is one of the two delta
functions, δy,AB or δy,B. (See the appendix for a formal proof.) This contradicts
Realist’s interpretation of the game, under which you can set P(y | g) to any
h(y) you desire.7
Conversely, if you can set P(y | g) to be an arbitrary g-independent distri-
bution (as Realist presumes), then what you set it to may affect P(g | y) (in
violation of Fearful’s presumption that P(g | y) is set exclusively by W). In
other words, if your having ‘free will’ means what it does to Realist, then you
have the power to change the prediction accuracy of W (!). As an example,
if you set P(y = AB | g) = 3/4 for all g’s such that P(g) , 0, then P(g | y)
cannot equal δg,y. So scenario [3] is also improper; ; it is over-played, in the
terminology of Sec. 3.2.
Combining our analyses of scenarios [1] through [3] shows that there are
two ways to formalize Newcomb’s scenario. You can be free to set P(y) how-
ever you want, with P(g | y) set by W , as Fearful presumes, or, as Realist
presumes, you can be free to set P(y | g) to whatever distribution h(y) you
want, with P(g) set by W . It is not possible to play both games simultaneously.
The resolution of Newcomb’s paradox is now immediate. When formal-
izing Newcomb’s scenario, we must pick either Realist’s game or Fearful’s.
Once we pick the game, the optimal choice of you is perfectly well-defined.
The only reason that there appears to be a paradox is that the way Newcomb’s
question is phrased leads one to think that somehow those two games are
being combined — and in fact combining the games leads to mathematical
impossibilities.
7 Note that of the two δ functions you can choose in this combined decomposition, it is
better for you to choose h(y) = δy,B, resulting in a payoff of 1, 000, 000. So your optimal
response to Newcomb’s question for this variant is the same as if you were Fearful.
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4.4. Discussion
It is important to emphasize that the impossibility of playing both games
simultaneously arises for almost any error rate α in the P(g | y) chosen by W ,
i.e., no matter how accurately W predicts. This means that the stipulation in
Newcomb’s paradox that W predicts perfectly is a red herring. (Interestingly,
Newcomb himself did not insist on such perfect prediction in his formulation
of the paradox, perhaps to avoid the time paradox problems.) The crucial
impossibility implicit in Newcomb’s question is the idea that at the same time
you can arbitrarily specify ‘your’ distribution P(y | g) and W can arbitrarily
specify ‘his” distribution P(g | y). In fact, neither of you two can set your
distribution without possibly affecting the other’s distribution; you and W are
inextricably coupled.
We also emphasize that vague concepts (e.g., ‘free will’) or controver-
sial ones (e.g., ‘causality’) are not relevant to the resolution of Newcomb’s
paradox; it is not necessary to introduce mathematizations of those concepts
to resolve Newcomb’s paradox. The only mathematics needed is standard
probability theory, together with the axioms of VonNeumann Morgenstern
utility theory.
Another important contribution of our resolution is that it shows that New-
comb’s scenario does not establish a conflict between game theory’s dom-
inance principle and its expected utility principle, as some have suggested.
Indeed, as mentioned, we adopt the standard expected utility axioms of game
theory throughout our analysis. However nowhere do we violate the domi-
nance principle.
The key behind our avoiding a conflict between those two principles is our
taking care to specify what Bayes net underlies the game. Realist’s reasoning
appears to follow the dominance principle, and Fearful’s to follow the princi-
ple of maximizing expected utility. (Hence the conflicting answers of Realist
and Fearful appear to illustrate a conflict between those two principles.) How-
ever Realist is actually following the principle of maximizing expected utility
for that Bayes net game for which Realist’s answer is correct. In contrast,
Realist’s reasoning is an unjustified violation of that principle for the Bayes
net game in which Realist’s answer is incorrect. (In particular, Realist’s an-
swer does not follow from the dominance principle in that Bayes net game.)
It is only by being sloppy in specifying the underlying Bayes net game that it
appears that there is a conflict between the expected utility principle and the
dominance principle.
Note also that your utility function is irrelevant to the paradox and its
resolution. The fundamental contradiction built into Newcomb’s scenario in-
volves the specification of the strategy sets of you and W . The associated
utility functions never appear.
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Another note-worthy point is that no time variable occurs in our analysis
of Newcomb’s paradox. Concretely, nothing in our analysis using Bayes nets
and associated games requires that W’s prediction occur before your choice.
This lack of a time variable in our analysis means we can assign times to
the events in our analysis any way we please, and the analysis still holds; the
analysis is time-reversal invariant.
This invariance helps clarify the differences in the assumptions made by
Realist and Fearful. The invariance means that both the formal statement of
the paradox and its resolution are unchanged if the prediction occurs after
your choice rather than (as is conventional) before your choice. In other
words, W could use data accumulated up to a time after you make your choice
to ‘retroactively predict’ what your choice was. In the extreme case, the ‘pre-
diction’ algorithm could even directly observe your choice. All of the mathe-
matics introduced above concerning Bayes nets, and possible contradictions
still holds.
In particular, in this time-reversed version of Newcomb’s scenario, Fearful
would be concerned that W can observe his choice with high accuracy. (That’s
what it means to have P(g | y) be a delta function whose argument is set by
the value of y.) Formally, this is exactly the same as the concern of Fearful
in the conventional Newcomb’s scenario that W can predict his choice with
high accuracy.
In contrast, in the time-reversed version of Newcomb’s scenario, Realist
would believe that he can guarantee that his choice is independent of what
W says he chooses. (That’s what it means to have P(y | g) equal some h(y),
independent of g.) In essence, he assumes that you can completely hide your
choice from W , so that W can only guess randomly what choice you made.
Formally, this assumption is exactly the same as the ‘free will’ belief of Real-
ist in the conventional Newcomb’s scenario that you can force W’s prediction
to be independent of your choice.
In this time-reversed version of Newcomb’s scenario, the differences be-
tween the assumptions of Realist and Fearful are far starker than in the con-
ventional form of Newcomb’s scenario, as is the fact that those assumptions
are inconsistent. One could use this time-reversed version to try to argue
in favor of one set of assumptions or the other (i.e., argue in favor of one
Bayes net game or the other). Our intent instead is to clarify that Newcomb’s
question does not specify which Bayes net game is played, and therefore is
not properly posed. As soon as one or the other of the Bayes net games is
specified, then Newcomb’s question has a unique, correct answer.
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5. Conclusion
Newcomb’s paradox has been so vexing that it has led some to resort to non-
Bayesian probability theory in their attempt to understand it (Gibbard and
Harper, 1978; Hunter and Richter, 1978), some to presume that payoff must
somehow depend on your beliefs as well as what’s under the boxes (Geanako-
plos, 1997), and has even even led some to claim that quantum mechanics
is crucial to understanding the paradox (Piotrowski and Sladkowski, 2002).
This is all in addition to work on the paradox based on now-discredited
formulations of causality (Jacobi, 1993).
Our analysis shows that the resolution of Newcomb’s paradox is in fact
quite simple. Newcomb’s paradox takes two incompatible interpretations of
a question, with two different answers, and makes it seem as though they are
the same interpretation. The lesson of Newcomb’s paradox is just the ancient
verity that one must carefully define all one’s terms.
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Choose AB Choose B
Predict AB: 1000 0
Predict B: 1, 001, 000 1, 000, 000
Table 1: The payoff to you for the four combinations of your choice and W’s
prediction.
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APPENDIX
In the text, it is claimed that if for some α ∈ (1/2, 1], W can ensure that
P(g | y) = αδg,y + (1 − α)(1 − δg,y) for all y such that P(y) , 0, and if in
addition P(y | g) is g-independent for all g such that P(g) , 0, then in fact
P(y | g) is one of the two delta functions, δy,AB or δy,B. This can be seen just
by examining the general 2×2 table of values of P(g, y) that is consistent with
the first hypothesis, that P(g | y) = αδg,y + (1 − α)(1 − δg,y):
y = AB y = B
g = AB: αzAB (1 − α)zB
g = B: (1 − α)zAB αzB
Table 2: The probabilities of the four combinations of your choice y and W’s
prediction g, given that P(g | y) = αδg,y + (1 − α)(1 − δg,y) for all y with
non-zero P(y). Both zAB and zB are in [0, 1], and normalization means that
zAB + zB = 1.
If both zAB , 0 and zB , 0, then neither P(g = AB) nor P(g = B)
equals zero. Under such a condition, the second hypothesis, that P(y | g)
is g-independent for all g such that P(g) , 0, would mean that P(y | g) is the
same function of y for both g’s. This in turn means that
αzAB
(1 − α)zB =
(1 − α)zAB
αzB
(4)
which is impossible given our bounds on α. Accordingly, either zAB or zB
equals zero. QED
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